Friday, August 7, 2026

A Progressive COLA‑Cap Approach for Strengthening Social Security’s Finances

This week, Advisor Perspectives published my article entitled, “Social Security’s Short‑Term Crisis: What Advisor’s Must Prepare For.” The primary purpose of this article was to focus on possible solutions to the system’s short-term financing problems, not its long-term financial problems. One of the alternative solutions discussed in the article involved freezing cost‑of‑living increases (COLAs) for several years. While a temporary freeze is an efficient short‑term lever, it is also regressive and politically difficult. An alternative approach is to modify the COLA formula itself in a way that protects lower‑benefit retirees while moderating both short-term and potential long-term cost growth.

This post outlines a progressive COLA‑cap mechanism that accomplishes those goals.

  1. Concept: A Progressive COLA Cap

Under current law, COLAs are proportional to benefit size: every retiree receives the same percentage increase, so higher‑benefit retirees receive larger dollar increases. This structure is not inherently progressive.

A progressive alternative is:

COLA = the lesser of (CPI increase) or $X, but not less than Y% of the CPI increase.

This creates a dollar cap on the annual COLA. Low‑benefit retirees would typically receive full CPI, while higher‑benefit retirees receive a smaller percentage increase.

  1. Annual Redetermination of

To avoid arbitrary or outdated caps, can be recalculated each year:

where is the average retired‑worker benefit in the prior year or some percentage of the average benefit.

This ensures:

  • Automatic scaling as benefits grow.
  • Built‑in progressivity: retirees below the average benefit rarely hit the cap.
  • Predictable savings tied to the benefit distribution.
  1. Determination of Y

Y determines the floor percentage increase applicable to beneficiaries with relatively higher benefit levels. This rate would be a lower percentage of the full COLA rate or even start at zero and gradually increase over the years depending on how much is needed to help solve the system’s short-term funding problem. 

  1. Addressing Fairness for Early/Late Claimers

A potential fairness issue arises with this general proposal because delayed claimers have higher benefits due to actuarially fair delayed retirement credits. Under a simple dollar cap, they are more likely to be constrained even though their higher benefit is “earned.”

A refinement is to apply the cap test to:

where is the early/late retirement factor. This effectively bases the cap on the retiree’s PIA‑equivalent benefit, aligning the cap with lifetime earnings rather than claiming age.

This adjustment:

  • Improves actuarial fairness.
  • Removes behavioral distortions related to claiming age.
  • Adds complication to the proposal.
  1. Example

Let’s assume Congress sets X at 50% of the average monthly benefit (assumed to be $2,000) for the preceding year and sets Y as 25% of the full COLA. The following table shows the COLAs for beneficiaries with various ERF-adjusted benefits assuming the full COLA is 3% under the proposal:

ERF-Adjusted Monthly Benefit

COLA

$1,000 and below

3%

$2,000

1.5%

$3,000

1%

$4,000 and above

0.75%

  1. Short-Term or Long-Term Solution?

Depending on the X and Y chosen by Congress and the effective date of implementation, the proposal may not be as efficient as part of a short-term solvency patch as a COLA freeze, but it could be more effective as part of addressing the long-term problem.

A progressive COLA cap could directly affect post‑entitlement price indexing, which compounds over decades. The result is a structural flattening of benefit growth, concentrated among higher‑benefit retirees.

This makes the proposal well‑suited for inclusion in a comprehensive long‑term solvency package, alongside more modest tax adjustments or benefit formula changes.

  1. Summary

A progressive COLA cap:

  • Protects lower‑benefit retirees from inflation erosion.
  • Moderates long‑run benefit growth.
  • Preserves political feasibility better than a COLA freeze.
  • May provide more modest short‑term savings but offers significant long‑term compounding savings (depending on provisions adopted), and
  • Can be refined using PIA/ERF adjustments to improve fairness.